Computational Grids are large scale computing system composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) 
Introduction
In current distributed systems such as computational grids, resources belong to different self interested agents or organizations. These agents may manipulate the load allocation algorithm in their own benefit and their selfish behavior may lead to severe performance degradation and poor efficiency. Solving such problems involving selfish agents is the object of mechanism design theory (also called implementation theory) [10] . This theory helps design protocols in which the agents are always forced to tell the truth and follow the rules. Such mechanisms are called truthful or strategy-proof.
Each participating agent has a privately known function called valuation which quantifies the agent benefit or loss. The valuation depends on the outcome and is reported to a centralized mechanism. The mechanism chooses an outcome that maximizes a given objective function and makes payments to the agents. The valuations and payments are expressed in some common unit of currency. The payments are designed and used to motivate the agents to report their true valuations. Reporting the true valuations leads to an optimal value for the objective function. The goal of each agent is to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment.
In this paper we consider the mechanism design problem for load balancing in distributed systems. A general formulation of the load balancing problem is as follows: given a large number of jobs, find the allocation of jobs to computers optimizing a given objective function (e.g. total execution time). Our goal is to design a mechanism that uses the optimal load balancing algorithm. The optimal algorithm belongs to the global approach in the classification presented in [4] . To design our mechanism we use the framework derived by Archer and Tardos in [1] . We assume that each computer in the distributed system is characterized by its processing rate and only computer knows the true value of its processing rate. Jobs arrive at the system with a given arrival rate. The optimal algorithm finds the fraction of load that is allocated to each computer such that the expected execution time is minimized. The cost incurred by each computer is proportional to its utilization. The mechanism will ask each agent (computer) to report its processing rate and then compute the allocation using the optimal algorithm. After computing the allocation the mechanism hands payments to computers. Each computer goal is to chose a processing rate to report to the mechanism such that its profit is maximized. The profit is the difference between the payment handed by the mechanism and the true cost of processing the allocated jobs. The payments handed by the mechanism must motivate the computers to report their true value such that the expected response time of the entire system is minimized. Thus we need to design a payment function that guarantees this property.
Related work
Recently, with the emergence of the Internet as a global platform for computation and communication, the need for efficient protocols that deals with self-interested agents has increased. This motivated the use of mechanism design theory in different settings such as market based protocols for resource allocation in computational grids [3, 13] , market based protocols for scheduling [12] , congestion control [5] and mechanisms for trading CPU time [8] . For an introduction to general mechanism design theory see [10] . The most important result in mechanism design theory is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [10] . The VCG mechanism allows arbitrary form for valuations and its applicability is restricted to utilitarian objective functions (i.e. the objective function is the sum of agents' valuations). Nisan and Ronen [9] studied the mechanism design problem for several standard problems in computer science. Using the VCG mechanism they solved the shortest path problem in a graph where each edge belongs to a different agent.
For scheduling on unrelated machines they designed an Ò-approximation truthful mechanism, where Ò is the number of agents. Archer and Tardos [1] applied mechanism design theory to several combinatorial optimization problems where agent's secret data is represented by a single real valued parameter. They provided a method to design mechanisms for general objective functions and restricted form for valuations. For scheduling related parallel machines they gave a 3-approximation algorithm and used it to design a truthful mechanism. They also gave truthful mechanisms for maximum flow, scheduling related machines to minimize the sum of completion times, optimizing an affine function and special cases of uncapacitated facility location.
Our results
We design a truthful mechanism for solving the static load balancing problem in distributed systems. We prove that using the optimal allocation algorithm the output function admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying voluntary participation. We derive a protocol that implements our mechanism and present experiments to show its effectiveness. Organization The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the mechanism design terminology. In Section 3 we present our distributed system model. In Section 4 we design a truthful mechanism for load balancing in distributed systems. In Section 5 the effectiveness of our load balancing mechanism is investigated. In Section 6 we draw conclusions and present future directions.
Mechanism Design Concepts
In this section we introduce some important mechanism design concepts. We limit our description to mechanism design problems for one parameter agents. In this type of mechanism design problems each agent has some private data represented by a single real valued parameter [1] . In the following we define such problem. (iv) The goal of the mechanism is to select an output that optimizes a given cost function ´ µ. ¾
We assume that the cost functions have the following particular form: Ó×Ø ´Ø µ Ø , i.e. Ø represents the cost per unit load.
Definition 2.2 (Mechanism)
A mechanism is characterized by two functions: (ii) The payment function È´ µ that gives the payment handed by the mechanism to each agent. ¾
Notation:
In the rest of the paper we denote by the vector of bids not including the bid of agent . The vector is represented as´ µ. A desirable property of a mechanism is that the profit of a truthful agent is always non-negative. The agents hope for a profit by participating in the mechanism. 
Distributed System Model
We consider a distributed system that consists of Ò heterogeneous computers connected by a communication network. Computers have the same processing capabilities in the sense that a job may be processed from start to finish at any computer in the system. We assume that each computer is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing system (i.e. Poisson arrivals and exponentially distributed processing times) [6] and is characterized by its average processing rate , ½ Ò . Jobs are generated by users and arrive at the system according to a time invariant Poisson process with average rate¨. We call¨the total job arrival rate in the system. The total job arrival rate must be less than the aggregate processing rate of the system (i.e.¨ È Ò ½ ).
The system has to decide on how to distribute jobs to computers such that it will operate optimally. We assume that the decision to distribute jobs to computers is static i.e. it does not depend on the current state of the system. Thus we need to find the load that is assigned to computer ( ½ Ò ) such that the expected response time of all jobs is minimized. The expected response time at computer is given by:
Thus the overall expected response time is given by:
where ´ ½ ¾ Ò µ is the vector of loads assigned to computers. We assume that computers are agents and each of them has a true value Ø represented by the inverse of its processing rate, Ø ½ . Only computer knows Ø . The mechanism will ask each computer to report its value (the inverse of its processing rate). The computers may not report the true value. After all the computers report their values the mechanism computes an output function ´ µ ´ ½´ µ ¾´ µ Ò´ µµ according to the agents' bids such that the overall expected execution time is minimized. The mechanism also hands a payment È ´ µ to each computer. All computers know the algorithm used to compute the output function (allocation) and the payment scheme.
Each computer incurs some cost: Ó×Ø Ø ´ µ. The cost is equivalent to computer utilization. The greater the utilization, the greater the cost. We assume each computer wants to choose its strategy (what value to report) such that its profit is maximized. The profit for each computer is defined as the payment received from the mechanism minus the cost incurred in running the jobs allocated to it:
ÔÖÓ Ø È ´ µ Ó×Ø ´ µ.
Our goal is to design a truthful mechanism that minimizes the overall expected response time of the system. This involves finding an allocation algorithm and a payment scheme that minimizes the overall expected response time according to the computer bids and motivates all the computers to report their true values Ø .
Designing the Mechanism
To design our load balancing mechanism we use the framework proposed by Archer and Tardos in [1] . They provided a method to design mechanisms where each agent's true data is represented by a single real valued parameter. According to this method, to obtain a truthful mechanism we must find an output function satisfying two conditions: (a) it minimizes ´ µ and, (b) it is decreasing in the bids. In addition, we want a mechanism satisfying voluntary participation. To guarantee this property we must find a payment function satisfying voluntary participation.
First we are interested in finding an output function ´ µ that minimizes the expected execution time over all jobs, ´ µ, and produces a feasible allocation. Then we will show that this output function is decreasing in the bids. 
These conditions become: 
By solving these conditions one can obtain the optimal algorithm but this is not our focus in this paper. Algorithms for this kind of optimization problem were proposed in the past [11] . For the clarity of presentation we describe a variant of the algorithm in [11] using our notations. Our derivation of this algorithm is different from their approach and was partially presented above because some of the equations will be used to prove our results in Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 below. We now present the algorithm. We found an output function (given by OPTIM) that minimizes ´ µ. Now we must prove that this output function admits a truthful mechanism. In the following we state two theorems: (i) that the output function is decreasing in the bids (thus guaranteeing truthfulness) and, (ii) that our mechanism admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying voluntary participation. Due to space limitation the proofs of these two theorems are not presented here. They will be presented in the full version of the paper. 
Because the optimal algorithm assumes a central dispatcher, the mechanism will be implemented in a centralized way as part of the dispatcher code. We assume that the dispatcher is run on one of the computers and is able to communicate with all the other computers in the distributed system.
In the following we present the protocol that implements our load balancing mechanism (LBM). This protocol has two phases: bidding and completion.
Protocol LBM:
Phase I: Bidding 1. The dispatcher sends a request for bids message (ReqBid) to each computer in the system.
When a computer receives a
ReqBid it replies with its bid to the dispatcher.
Phase II: Completion 1. After the dispatcher collects all the bids it does the following:
1.1. Computes the allocation using OPTIM algorithm.
Computes the payments È for each computer using equation (8).
1.3. Sends È to each computer .
Each computer receives its payment and evaluates its profit.
This protocol is executed periodically or when there is a change in the total job arrival rate. During two executions of this protocol the jobs will be allocated to computers by the dispatcher according to the allocation computed by OPTIM. Computers will receive the maximum profit only when they report the true value.
Experimental results
To study the effectiveness of our truthful mechanism we simulated a heterogeneous system consisting of 16 computers with four different processing rates. In Table 1 we present the system configuration. The first row contains the relative processing rates of each of the four computer types. Here, the relative processing rate for computer is defined as the ratio of the processing rate of to the processing rate of the slowest computer in the system. The second row contains the number of computers in the system corresponding to each computer type. The last row shows the processing rate of each computer type in the system. We study the performance degradation due to false bids declarations. We define performance degradation(PD) as follows: È ´ Ì µ Ì µ½¼¼±, where is the response time of the system when one or more computers report false values; and Ì is the response time of the system when all computers report their true value. È quantifies the increase in the execution time due to false bidding.
We expect an increase in the response time and È when one or more computers lie.
In our experiments we consider that the fastest computer ½ declares false bids. ½ has Ø ½ ½ ½ as its true value. In Figure 1 we present the degradation in expected response time of the system for different values of system utilization (ranging from 10% to 90%) and two types of bidding: overbidding and underbidding. System utilization ( ) is defined as the ratio of total arrival rate to aggregate processing rate of the system:
. In the first experiment, ½ bids 7% lower than the true value. In this case the performance degradation is around 2% for low and medium system utilization, increasing drastically (around 300%) for high system utilization. This increase is due to computer ½ overloading. The overloading occurs because ½ bids lower, that means it reports a higher value for its processing rate. The algorithm will allocate more jobs to ½ increasing its response time. This increase is reflected in the expected response time of the system. In the second experiment, ½ bids 33% higher than the true value. In this case the performance degradation is about 6% at low system utilization, about 15% at medium system utilization and more than 80% at high system utilization. It can be observed that small deviations from the true value of only one computer may lead to large values of performance degradation. If we consider that more than one computer does not report its true value then we expect very poor performance. This justifies the need for a mechanism that will force the computers to declare their true values.
In Figure 2 we present the profit for each computer at medium system loads ( = 50%). It can be observed that the profit at ½ is maximum if it bids the true value, 3% lower if it bids higher and 1% lower if it bids lower. The mechanism penalizes ½ if it does not report the true value. When ½ bids lower the other computer's profits are lower because their payments decrease. Computers ½½ to ½ are not utilized when ½ underbids and when it reports the true value, thus they will not gain anything (ÔÖÓ Ø = 0, ½ ½ ½¾ ½ ). These computers will be utilized in the case when ½ overbids, getting a small profit. When ½ overbids the profit for all the computers except ½ is higher than in the case when ½ bids the true value. This is because the payments increase for these computers. An important issue is the frugality of our mechanism. We say that a mechanism is frugal if the mechanism's payments are small by some measure [2] . This property gives us an idea of how efficient a mechanism is. The mechanism is interested in keeping its payments as small as possible. Our mechanism must preserve voluntary participation, so the lower bound on its payments is the total cost incurred by the computers. In Figure 3 and 4 we present the cost and profit as fractions of the payment received by each computer at medium loads. It can be observed that the cost incurred by ½ when it bids higher is about 25% of the payment. In the case when ½ bids lower its cost is about 35% of the payment. For the other computers the cost is between 50% and 90% when ½ bids higher and between 53% and 100% when ½ bids lower. For the distributed system considered in these experiments (medium loads) the highest payment given to a computer is about 3 times its cost.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the problem of designing protocols for resource allocation involving selfish agents. Solving this kind of problems is the object of mechanism design theory. Using this theory we designed a truthful mechanism for solving the load balancing problem in heterogeneous distributed systems. We proved that using the optimal allocation algorithm the output function admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying voluntary participation. We derived a protocol that implements our mechanism and presented experiments to show its effectiveness. Future work will address the implementation of our load balancing mechanism in a real distributed system as well as the design of a distributed load balancing mechanism.
